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THE EASY CASE FOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW:  
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS POLINSKY AND SHAVELL 
John C.P. Goldberg∗ and Benjamin C. Zipursky∗∗ 
At least since World War II, tort law has played a more prominent 
role in the U.S. legal system than in those of other industrialized na-
tions.1  The emergence in the 1960s and 1970s of the doctrine of strict 
products liability was in many ways emblematic of this distinctiveness.  
The new regime was introduced not by legislatures, but by courts.2  
The rationales on which those courts relied were more instrumental 
than doctrinal.3  And the rules they fashioned conferred on judges and 
jurors broad discretion to impose new responsibilities on commercial 
product sellers.  In these respects, the products liability revolution had 
an ‘only-in-America’ flavor to it. 
A mere half-century later, American law is perhaps becoming dis-
tinctive for its hostility to the idea that consumers should have the 
right to obtain redress against manufacturers who have injured them 
through the sale of defective products.  Products liability law has been 
the subject of sustained attacks.  Advocates for business and profes-
sionals have insisted that it is a drag on innovation, quality, and com-
petitiveness.4  Libertarians have complained that its mandatory obliga-
tions prevent citizens from trading cost for safety.5  A coordinated 
public relations campaign has helped convince many Americans that it 
is primarily a means by which the foolish and the feckless foist respon-
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 ∗ Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
 ∗∗ Professor of Law and James H. Quinn Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham University School of 
Law. 
  Many thanks to the Editors of the Harvard Law Review and to Professors Polinsky and 
Shavell for permitting this response and to Jennifer Arlen, Anita Bernstein, Albert Choi, George 
Conk, Mark Geistfeld, Alexandra Lahav, John Manning, Richard Nagareda, Bob Rabin, Adam 
Scales, Catherine Sharkey, and Jed Shugerman for helpful comments on earlier drafts.  Responsi-
bility for errors in what follows is ours. 
 1 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 127–
28 (2001). 
 2 See Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 CARDO-
ZO L. REV. 2193, 2195–97 (1989); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Criti-
cal History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 505 
(1985). 
 3 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing deterrence and compensation rationales for strict products liability). 
 4 THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER 
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 23–24 (2002). 
 5 See Epstein, supra note 2, at 2202–05; Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability 
Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 368 (1988). 
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sibility onto others.6  Even among those unpersuaded by these criti-
cisms, many are prone to dismiss products liability law as second-rate 
regulation or insurance — a clumsy governance structure left over 
from pre-modern times.7 
Products liability law still has important proponents of various 
stripes, and the criticisms of it (and of tort law more generally) have 
not gone unanswered.8  But the critics — aided by a succession of 
presidential administrations overtly hostile to tort law, a corresponding 
shift in the temperament of the judiciary, and ongoing economic inse-
curity — have been winning the day.  Across the country, state courts 
have (perhaps justifiably) pulled back from liability-expanding deci-
sions such as Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,9 Sindell v. Abbott Labo-
ratories,10 and Beshada v. Johns-Mansville Products Corp.11  Many 
state legislatures have imposed general limitations on liability (for ex-
ample, several-only liability), and some have established regulatory 
compliance defenses for manufacturers while also partially immunizing 
retailers from liability for product-related injuries.12  The U.S. Su-
preme Court has been quite willing to invoke its authority to interpret 
federal statutes and the Constitution as a means of untying itself from 
Erie’s mast so as to limit the reach of state products liability law.13 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 See generally WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLI-
TICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004). 
 7 See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW 
COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS (1989) (arguing 
that tort law’s inefficiencies warrant its replacement by alternative compensation schemes). 
 8 See Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2007) 
(book review) (noting other authors’ rebuttals of many of the main critiques of the tort system). 
 9 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); see id. at 452 (permitting design defect claims to prevail under ei-
ther a consumer expectations or risk-utility test).  Without purporting to overrule Barker, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court has since made clear that the risk-utility test is required for all products 
liability suits that require expert testimony to aid the jury in making the defect determination.  
Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994). 
 10 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980); see id. at 936–38 (allowing persons injured by in utero exposure to 
DES to recover under the theory of market share liability).  With a few exceptions, state high 
courts have consistently declined to extend market share theory to claims alleging injuries caused 
by asbestos, lead paint, tobacco, and other products.  Donald G. Gifford & Paolo Pasicolan, Mar-
ket Share Liability Beyond DES Cases: The Solution to the Causation Dilemma in Lead Paint 
Litigation?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 115, 118 (2006).  Some have declined to apply it to DES.  See, e.g., 
Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 345 (Ill. 1990); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 
67, 75–76 (Iowa 1986). 
 11 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982); see id. at 546 (permitting recovery on a failure-to-warn theory 
even on the assumption that the danger to be warned of was not knowable at the time of the 
product’s sale).  The New Jersey Supreme Court quickly and substantially limited Beshada’s 
reach.  See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 387–88 (N.J. 1984). 
 12 See Carl Tobias, FDA Regulatory Compliance Reconsidered, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 
1025–27 (2008) (listing states that have adopted some form of regulatory compliance defense). 
 13 See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (holding that the Medical Devices 
Amendments implicitly preempts design defect liability for devices that meet certain FDA stan-
dards); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) (identifying due process require-
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With the election of a President who has not shown open antipathy 
for the tort system, one might expect this tide to turn.  In some re-
spects it has.14  However, the political situation at the federal level 
may be more receptive to products liability reform than might be sup-
posed.  Tort law is appropriately low on the list of this Administra-
tion’s priorities.  To the extent it garners attention, it may not fare well 
in times of economic crisis, particularly insofar as the White House is 
imbued with a technocratic outlook that favors expert agencies and 
systemic solutions over a system of one-off adjudications.  Certainly it 
is conceivable that the present Administration might be tempted to use 
tort reform as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with political  
adversaries.15 
Now into this mix comes an article in the Harvard Law Review 
titled The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, authored by Professors 
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell.16  The article is not an advo-
cacy piece, nor even a white paper charting a program of law reform.  
It is instead a brief survey of prior analyses of benefits delivered by, 
and costs associated with, the application of tort law to injuries caused 
by widely sold products.  Based on that survey, it offers a preliminary 
assessment of whether tort law, thus applied, is net beneficial to socie-
ty.  While measured in tone, Uneasy generates a surprising and stark 
conclusion: that it is probably desirable for manufacturers not to be 
subject to any tort liability for injuries caused to consumers by widely 
sold products.17  Given its message, as well as its timing and placement 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ments for jury instructions on punitive damages); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 
141 (1999) (holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence require trial courts to assess the scientific 
validity of expert testimony on engineering questions pertaining to product design). 
 14 For example, President Obama has instructed the heads of federal departments and agen-
cies to cease issuing, and to reconsider extant, regulatory preambles that urge courts to interpret 
federal safety standards as preemptive of state tort liability.  Preemption, Memorandum for the 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (May 20, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693 (May 22, 
2009). 
 15 President Obama has so far suggested only that the federal government should encourage 
states to experiment with different reforms of medical malpractice law.  Amy Goldstein, On Mal-
practice Reform, Fine Print Is Still Hazy, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2009, at A7.  In raising the pos-
sibility of these sorts of tradeoffs, we do not mean to suggest that they would necessarily be inap-
propriate.  Everything will depend on the terms of the bargain. 
 16 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 1437 (2010). 
 17 Id. at 1491–92 (suggesting that, in light of Uneasy’s cost-benefit analysis, legislation might 
be contemplated “that would limit or eliminate product liability in certain industries or for certain 
widely sold products,” id. at 1492).  To judges, the authors offer a less radical recommendation, 
which is that courts consider three factors to weigh against the imposition of products liability, 
two of which replicate extant doctrine: (a) that there is widespread consumer knowledge of the 
relevant danger posed by the product and (b) that the design and manufacture of the product 
were governed by safety regulations.  See id.; DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 
§ 10.2, at 627–28 (2005) (observing that the obviousness of a product’s danger is a factor in deter-
mining whether it is defective); id. § 14.3, at 888 (noting that evidence of compliance with safety 
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and the prominence of its authors, Uneasy might be the rare article 
that escapes the fate of obscurity that awaits most academic legal  
scholarship. 
Unfortunately, Uneasy cannot sustain the burden it has set for it-
self.  The evidence it marshals is surprisingly scant, consisting of anec-
dotes about products that suffered declining sales after being linked to 
certain injuries, observations about consumers’ improved access to 
safety information, a brief review of inconclusive studies of whether a 
rule of strict liability better deters the sale of unsafe products than a 
negligence rule, reminders of the high costs of civil litigation, and a 
smattering of microeconomic theory.  These observations are nowhere 
near sufficient.  In essence, Uneasy argues for the elimination of an en-
tire body of law based on the absence of social scientific evidence of a 
certain sort demonstrating the significance of its contribution to the 
goals of deterrence and compensation.  For anyone prepared to credit 
criticism on these terms, there is much more to be uneasy about than a 
branch of tort law: it is doubtful that any body of law measures up to 
these peculiar standards. 
In purporting to demonstrate the absence of a case for the imposi-
tion of liability on sellers for injuries caused by defective products, 
Uneasy also vests inexplicable confidence in market incentives and a 
regulatory system with failings that are exasperating to critics across 
the political spectrum.  Its apparent satisfaction with the level of first-
party health insurance enjoyed by injury victims today is no less puz-
zling.  And strikingly missing from the entire picture is any mention of 
the basic principle that a person wrongfully injured by the sale of a 
dangerous product should be able to hold the manufacturer account-
able for her injuries.  When one begins with a more realistic view of 
what products liability law really is, what place it holds within our po-
litical system, and what values it stands to serve, one quickly comes to 
appreciate that the basic case for products liability law is actually 
quite easy. 
In criticizing Uneasy both on its own terms and more generally, we 
do not mean to deny that products liability law has problems.  It is ex-
pensive and in some ways unpredictable.  On occasion, judges and ju-
rors mishandle scientific information, display insensitivity to business 
realities, are harsh in their judgments about victim behavior, and issue 
indefensible judgments about liability and damages.  Tort law can also 
interfere with the operation of other institutions.  Lawmakers, judges, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
regulations is relevant to issues of fault and defect).  As explained in Part I, infra, Polinsky and 
Shavell use the phrase “product liability” to encompass “[t]he liability of manufacturers of prod-
ucts for harms caused to their customers.”  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1438.  That is, 
they intend for it to capture all instances in which a manufacturer is subject to liability because its 
product has caused harm to a consumer of the product, irrespective of the theory of liability. 
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and scholars have long wrestled with these deficiencies and others, and 
they will continue to do so, as they should.  Uneasy is certainly helpful 
in reminding us that it is a mistake to consider tort law in isolation 
from other institutions that can deliver goods such as safety and com-
pensation, and that one must be attentive to the need to shape tort law 
with an eye toward these other institutions, just as these other institu-
tions should be shaped with an eye toward tort law.  However, these 
are problems that call for relatively fine-grained solutions.  They do 
not provide a reason to embrace skepticism about the value of having 
tort liability for product-related injuries in the first place. 
I.  THE UNEASY CASE 
A.  What Is “Products Liability”? 
To appreciate Uneasy’s aggressiveness, one must get hold of the 
scope of its argument.  Doing so is not easy because the phrase “prod-
ucts liability” has two meanings that generate claims of vastly different 
breadth, plausibility, and significance. 
In its narrower and more common usage, the phrase “products lia-
bility” is used to refer to a discrete tort cause of action (and related de-
fenses) that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.  The canonical sources for 
this new tort include the California Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.18 and section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, adopted in 1965.19  Prior to the mid-1960s, 
liability for product-related injuries was determined by reference to 
other generally applicable causes of action, especially negligence,20 
breach of warranty,21 and fraud.22  These other claims remain avail-
able in substance (and usually in form) to persons injured by products.  
However, it was expected and has proved to be the case that the new 
products liability tort would make redress available to injury victims 
who could not prevail on any of these other claims and would thus of-
ten obviate the need for victims to rely on them.  This is because the 
new tort’s liability standard was to be defect-based rather than  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
 19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 20 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (permitting neg-
ligence actions for injuries caused by carelessly made products irrespective of whether the injured 
party purchased the product directly from the manufacturer). 
 21 See, e.g., Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 175 N.E. 105, 106–07 (N.Y. 1931) (hold-
ing that an implied warranty action is available against the seller of a food item containing a for-
eign object). 
 22 See, e.g., Langridge v. Levy, (1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 863, 868 (Exch.) (holding that where a 
seller misrepresents a gun’s soundness to the purchaser, the seller can be liable in fraud for inju-
ries to the purchaser’s son caused by a defect in the gun). 
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conduct-based.  There is now a cause of action against a commercial 
seller who injures a consumer by sending into the stream of commerce 
a product containing a dangerous defect irrespective, at least to some 
degree, of how the defect arose.  Because the products liability cause of 
action focuses on the dangerous condition of the product, and not in 
the first instance on the degree of care exercised by the seller, the 
phrase “products liability,” used in its narrow sense, is often preceded 
by the adjective “strict.”  However, this label is misleading insofar as it 
suggests that a seller is subject to liability merely by virtue of sending 
a product out into the world that happens to cause personal injury or 
property damage.  The product must in addition be defective — sub-
standard in one way or another.23 
In contrast to the narrow usage just described, the phrase “prod-
ucts liability law” is also used to encompass not just the distinctive  
defect-based cause of action, but any recognized ground on which a 
seller might be held liable for injuries caused by its product.  One can 
get a sense of this broader usage by considering the allegations one 
might expect to find in a present-day complaint alleging injuries 
caused by a product.  In addition to asserting claims of product defect, 
the complaint may also contain counts for negligence and breach of 
warranty, as well as fraud, negligent misrepresentation, consumer 
fraud, civil RICO, and/or medical monitoring.  Some of these causes of 
action are of uncertain scope and validity.  Others, such as fraud, have 
impressive pedigrees and routinely support substantial judgments.  
The point is that each type of claim references a distinct legal wrong 
that might give rise to a manufacturer’s liability for injuries caused by 
one of its products. 
With these clarifications in mind, we can now get a hold of Un-
easy’s scope.  It does not merely purport to demonstrate weaknesses in 
the case for a pure form of strict liability that divorces manufacturer 
liability entirely from notions of fault.  Nor does it purport to find 
grounds for questioning the adoption by some courts of particularly 
aggressive forms of defect-based liability.  Indeed, it is not content to 
demonstrate that tort law for product-related injuries ought to be re-
turned to its pre-1963 condition.  Instead, it argues that, in all proba-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 See Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901 (holding that liability for product-related injuries attaches 
only to products containing a “defect in design and manufacture”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 402A(1) (stating that strict liability applies to products sold “in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer”).  Courts have subdivided the concept of defect 
into three variants: manufacturing defect, design defect, and warning defect.  Each kind of defect 
in some sense connotes fault, at least as to the manufacturer: a product with a manufacturing de-
fect is a lemon that the manufacturer let slip onto the market; one with a design defect was sub-
optimally designed; one with a warning defect was placed on the market without the warnings 
that were necessary to make it reasonably safe.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998). 
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bility, there is no justification for the application of even plain-vanilla 
negligence and warranty law to manufacturers of widely sold products.  
In short, it suggests that our legal system today would probably be 
doing the right thing if it were to recognize fewer grounds of liability 
for product-related injuries than were recognized under the old privity 
rule of Winterbottom v. Wright.24 
Admittedly, the article sometimes uses the phrase “product liability” 
in a sense that would suggest that it aims only to undermine the case 
for extensions of liability beyond traditional negligence and warranty 
principles.25  Yet the authors’ target must be broader than this.  None 
of their arguments are addressed to the onerousness or costliness of 
liability beyond fault-based liability.  In determining whether to retain 
“product liability,” they do not assess the deterrent effect of negligence, 
warranty, and fraud actions for product-related injuries even though 
such effects surely would have to be assessed if the question at hand is 
whether it is net beneficial to recognize stricter forms of liability.  
Their conclusion is not that legislatures or courts should contemplate 
reconfiguring this part of tort law so that it returns to the pre-1963 sta-
tus quo.  When they engage other scholars, they do not engage them 
on the issue of whether liability for product-related injuries should be 
fault-based.26  They also do not discuss the voluminous literature sug-
gesting that, at least for design and warning defect claims, the concept 
of defect is largely indistinct from the concept of fault — an idea cen-
tral to the products liability provisions of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts, published in 1998.27 
In short, the fact that the authors have nothing at all to say about 
which among several possible forms of tort liability should apply to 
product-related injuries clearly indicates that they do not mean to ad-
dress the issue of which among several liability standards might apply.  
Instead, the burden of Uneasy is to defend the far more ambitious 
claim that products liability law in its broader sense is unjustified — 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.) (limiting negligence claims against product sellers to direct 
buyers injured by seller carelessness). 
 25 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1453 & n.59 (using the phrase “product liability” to 
refer to the three variants on the defect-based cause of action). 
 26 See, e.g., Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to 
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 649 (1980) (arguing that, to the 
extent strict products liability is distinct from negligence, it should be eliminated in favor of negli-
gence); William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal To Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 639, 659–65 (same). 
 27 See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability 
Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 877–99 (2002) (reviewing argu-
ments that design and warning defect claims are de facto negligence claims).  For a defense by the 
Restatement’s Reporters of its negligence-oriented approach to defect-based liability, see James A. 
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 COR-
NELL L. REV. 867, 882–87 (1998). 
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that is that any and all tort liability for injuries caused to consumers 
by widely sold products should be eliminated.  If the argument of Un-
easy were adopted, a person who suffers serious burns when her toast-
er catches fire during ordinary use would be left remediless even if she 
is prepared to prove that the manufacturer unreasonably neglected the 
risk of fire in designing and assembling the toaster, or acted with reck-
less indifference toward that risk. 
B.  The Case for the Uneasy Case 
Uneasy begins by positing three possible social benefits that might 
flow from imposing tort liability on sellers of products for injuries 
caused to consumers by their products.28  First, the threat of liability 
might incentivize manufacturers to sell safer products.  Second, the 
imposition of liability could help ensure that products’ prices reflect 
their true social cost, including an increment representing the cost of 
foreseeable harm that the product might cause to a purchaser, dis-
counted by the probability of that harm’s occurring.  Third, liability 
might provide compensation to injury victims to help cover injury-
related expenses including medical care, lost income, and pain and suf-
fering.  Against these potential benefits, two types of costs are 
weighed.29  First, there are the direct costs of operating the tort system, 
including primarily the fees collected by lawyers who represent tort 
plaintiffs and defendants.  Second, these direct costs can generate indi-
rect costs.30 
Now for the accounting.  The benefit side of the ledger is examined 
first.  Citing some studies that have attempted to measure the incre-
ment of safety attributable to the threat of liability under a regime of 
defect-based liability, Uneasy concludes that there is none, at least 
with respect to widely sold products, the safety of which is already 
suitably encouraged by market pressures and the attention of govern-
ment regulators to product dangers.31  What about the compensation 
benefit?32  Uneasy points out that the need for compensation on the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1443–69. 
 29 Id. at 1469–72. 
 30 For example, insofar as manufacturers and consumers build expected litigation costs into 
the prices at which they sell and buy products, these higher prices might block what would oth-
erwise be welfare-enhancing purchases. 
 31 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1458 (surmising from a very small sample of inconclu-
sive industry studies that the safety benefit from products liability is “small”). 
 32 Uneasy says relatively little about the signaling benefit, but is similarly skeptical that it 
amounts to much.  First it notes that, although prices can communicate information about prod-
uct risks, consumers can learn about these risks in other ways.  Id. at 1473–74.  Second, it re-
sponds to Hanson and Logue’s claim that tort law generates a signaling benefit by correcting 
price distortions introduced by consumers’ access to first-party insurance, which may induce them 
to buy products they would otherwise not buy.  Id. at 1461 (citing Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D.  
Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 
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part of many Americans is already being met wholly or partly by 
health insurance, life insurance, disability insurance, and property in-
surance.  To be sure, if insurance coverage is absent or incomplete, tort 
damages can fill these gaps.  However, for the partially insured, insur-
ers’ subrogation rights often entail that tort compensation will be 
passed through the plaintiff to her insurer (so as to reimburse the 
plaintiff for insurance benefits provided to her).  And regardless of 
whether they are partially insured or uninsured, tort victims typically 
must pay a chunk of any compensation they receive to their lawyers.  
In addition, money paid to tort plaintiffs for their pain and suffering is 
‘low value’ money.  Dollars do not ease anguish (the argument goes).  
It follows that, insofar as tort awards compensate for intangible harms, 
the marginal welfare benefit the victim will extract from those dollars 
is relatively small.  Finally, even if a meager showing can be made on 
the compensation side of the ledger, a quick examination of costs ren-
ders implausible any notion of a net compensation benefit.  If, as some 
have suggested, fifty cents of every compensation dollar is going to 
administrative costs, tort is not an efficient way to transfer money to 
victims. 
Uneasy thus generates the striking conclusion that a consumer in-
jured by a widely sold product should not recover in tort from the 
manufacturer.  Nonetheless, it is prepared to endorse suits by victims 
of narrowly sold products.33  Manufacturers of these products, it sup-
poses, are less likely to be subject to forces other than the threat of tort 
liability that will tend to induce them to produce safe products.  In 
addition, even with respect to widely sold products, claims by injured 
bystanders are deemed potentially net beneficial.34 
II.  THE EMPIRICS OF DETERRENCE 
We first consider the case made by Uneasy regarding the deterrent 
effect of tort law as applied to widely sold products.  We conclude that 
its analysis uses an inappropriate metric for assessing tort law’s impact 
and significantly overstates the evidence for concluding that tort law 
has no deterrent effect. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1990), and arguing that coverage is not broad enough to generate a 
significant distortion).  Finally, it argues that, insofar as manufacturers and consumers build ex-
pected litigation costs into their pricing and purchasing decisions, the tort system may send dis-
torted signals that block welfare-enhancing transactions.  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 
1472. 
 33 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1476. 
 34 Id. at 1490–91.  The argument is that manufacturers who injure bystanders do not stand to 
lose business: their customers are not the ones being hurt. 
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A.  Measuring Tort Law’s Marginal Contribution to Product Safety 
A reader of Uneasy might be forgiven for supposing that its cost-
benefit calculus rests in part on the claim that tort law as applied to 
products does nothing at all to induce manufacturers to make safer 
products.35  But this cannot be the case, for such a claim is overtly 
contradicted by studies on which Uneasy relies.  For example, it re-
counts a 1991 article by Professor John Graham that attempts to 
measure the contribution of products liability law to automobile safe-
ty.36  After briefly recounting episodes such as the Ford Pinto gas-tank 
ruptures and the introduction of automatic seat belts, the article specu-
lates for each whether products liability law “was a necessary, suffi-
cient, contributing, or insignificant cause of safety improvements,”37 
concluding that in most instances “liability was a contributing factor in 
achieving safety improvements.”38  In an effort to refine these gestalt 
judgments, the Graham article also looks for a statistical correlation 
between increases in the incidence of so-called “crashworthiness” lia-
bility for automobile-accident injuries and reductions in such inju-
ries.39  By this method, it finds that products liability law “is one of 
several forces that induce manufacturers to consider making pro-safety 
decisions in the marketplace,”40 and that “[i]n some cases . . . liability 
seemed to cause safety improvements to occur more quickly than they 
would have occurred in the absence of liability.”41 
So Uneasy’s proposed rejection of products liability on cost-benefit 
grounds cannot rely on the claim that tort law, as applied to widely 
sold products, has no deterrent effect.42  Rather, it turns on the claim 
that tort law makes no additional contribution to product safety 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 See id. at 1458 (speculating that products liability produces only a “small” safety benefit for 
widely sold products). 
 36 John D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: 
THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 120 (Peter W. Huber & Rob-
ert E. Litan eds., 1991). 
 37 Id. at 180. 
 38 Id. at 181. 
 39 To his credit, Graham issued a warning about over-interpreting his data analysis.  See id. at 
183.  The proxy for liability used by Graham is an apparently unpublished paper collecting “the 
annual number of reported crashworthiness cases obtained through a LEXIS search.”  Id. at 186–
87.  One cannot tell what sort of counting the author of this study undertook.  (Crashworthiness 
cases in which plaintiffs prevailed and which survived on appeal?)  And the crashworthiness doc-
trine is itself a special application of products liability law: the growth in the number of crashwor-
thiness cases during the study period may well have occurred at a faster rate than the growth in 
other claims for automobile-related defects.  The dependent variable, meanwhile, is not car acci-
dent–related injuries, but car accident deaths.  Are the numbers for nonfatal injury–producing 
accidents similar? 
 40 Id. at 183. 
 41 Id. at 183–84. 
 42 Note also that Uneasy’s tentative reprieve for claims by bystanders and for persons injured 
by narrowly sold products presupposes that tort liability creates incentives for safety. 
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beyond the contributions already provided by markets (which ‘sanc-
tion’ sellers of unsafe products through lower sales) and by direct gov-
ernment regulation.  Moreover, this latter claim is further weakened by 
the introduction of an evidentiary qualification.  In the end, the claim 
with respect to the safety benefit is this: the handful of studies on the 
deterrent effect of products liability law fail to provide clear proof that 
it generates incentives to produce safe products beyond those incentives 
provided by the threat of adverse publicity and the operation of regula-
tory safety regimes.43 
The evidentiary standard set by Uneasy is stacked: it ‘blames’ tort 
law for the primitive state of the empirical literature on its deterrent 
effects.  To date, only a few studies have been conducted.  Because of 
poor information and the difficulty of controlling for the relevant var-
iables, these studies have been forced to rely on very rough proxies.  
And for the most part they have generated weak conclusions.  Under 
these circumstances, to start with an assumption that products liability 
law’s defenders must meet a strong evidentiary burden on its effica-
ciousness is to beg the question.  The standards used by social scien-
tists for proof of causal efficacy are far too demanding to serve as cri-
teria for making practical judgments about whether to retain or 
displace an entire body of law. 
Even leaving aside the problems posed for the no-added-deterrence 
argument by its use of an inapt evidentiary standard, there are at least 
three problems with the argument’s substance.  The first is that it does 
not run markets or the regulatory state through the same ringer as it 
does products liability law.  The efficacy of modern markets in enhanc-
ing product safety is said to be proved by some facts and figures con-
cerning media coverage of products safety–related news items, coupled 
with mention of a handful of episodes in which products that came to 
be perceived as dangerous lost market share.44  Possible countervailing 
factors are mentioned, including disputes about a product’s danger-
ousness45 and familiar issues of cognitive psychology,46 but no effort is 
made to weigh their significance.  There is also an overlooked but ob-
vious lag problem: the attainment of widespread awareness of product 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1473 (“[W]e found no statistical evidence suggest-
ing that product liability has in fact enhanced product safety for the three widely sold products 
that have been studied: general aviation aircraft, automobiles, and the DPT vaccine.”). 
 44 Id. at 1443–50.  One of these episodes — that of the loss of market share for Tylenol follow-
ing an instance of product tampering that led to the deaths of several users — seems unusual in 
that it does not obviously involve public attention to an issue of product safety, as opposed to an 
issue of criminal misconduct.  See id. at 1443–44. 
 45 Id. at 1444–45.  Most familiarly, manufacturers of tobacco products for years insisted that 
there was no proof that their products cause adverse health effects. 
 46 Id. at 1448. 
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dangers occurs over time,47 meaning that by the time the market cor-
rects for the change, the defects may have already done much harm. 
Likewise, as compared to products liability law, the regulatory state 
is treated with kid gloves.  There is a passing mention of budget con-
straints and regulatory capture,48 but again no attempt to weigh their 
significance.49  The reader is left with the false impression that, on 
balance, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is an ener-
getic and effective regulator and that the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) operate free from political influence, budgetary constraints, 
dependency on regulated entities for information, and the inherent lim-
itations of ex ante regulation.50  Nor does Uneasy address the vast 
cost-internalization literature — oddly, given that this is a literature to 
which Polinsky and Shavell have made notable contributions.51  A 
standard claim within this literature identifies as a potential weakness 
of regulations that, even when enforced, they tend to generate penal-
ties that are not correlated with the losses actually caused by the viola-
tions.  By contrast, tort damages, at least in principle, generate full 
cost internalization and hence efficient deterrence. 
Second, Uneasy seems to treat public information, regulatory ac-
tion, and the tort system as, for the most part, operating independently 
of one another.52  There is plenty of reason to believe that these three 
modes of ‘regulation’ influence one another.  The filing of litigation is 
presumably sometimes necessary for the discovery of the newsworthy 
story behind a product’s dangers, and litigation can itself be news that 
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 47 To take but one prominent example, defective tires manufactured by Bridgestone/Firestone 
probably caused several hundred deaths and hundreds of injuries over several years before being 
recalled.  See Class Action Status Given to Ford and Firestone Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, 
at C4. 
 48 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1453. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 
172–201 (1990) (discussing NHTSA’s vulnerability to shifts in political winds); Alexandra B. 
Klass, State Innovation and Preemption: Lessons from State Climate Change Efforts, 41 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1653, 1674 n.88 (2008) (noting criticisms of the FDA and CPSC for inefficacy and vulner-
ability to political forces); George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in 
LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184, 184 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 
1988) (“No one conscious of the dwindling budget and meager accomplishments of the [CPSC] can 
pretend that the United States makes a serious effort to regulate product quality directly.”); Teresa 
M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer 
Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32 (1982); Barry Meier, F.D.A. Seeks Better Data from Tests of 
Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at B1 (discussing studies of inadequacies in information pro-
vided to the FDA by manufacturers seeking approval for new medical devices). 
 51 See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987); A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 869 (1998). 
 52 There is a passing reference to possible interactions, rather than a meaningful weighing of 
their importance.  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1454–55. 
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focuses consumer attention on alleged product dangers and attracts 
regulatory attention.  News of alleged product-related injuries can fo-
ment litigation and regulation.53  The enactment of regulation can 
generate news coverage and litigation.  Given these probable synergies, 
it is almost certainly a mistake to posit that, once tort law is removed 
from the bundle of regulatory sticks, market and regulatory forces will 
have the same deterrent effect that they now have. 
Finally, and most importantly, even if one were to grant that tort 
law offers no incremental deterrent effect, this concession provides no 
grounds for the ultimate conclusion of Uneasy.  Rather it provides an 
argument against redundant incentivizing.  This is just as much an ar-
gument for dismantling the regulatory regime governing product safety 
as it is an argument for getting rid of tort law: one needs a further ex-
planation of why the existence of two redundant systems entails the 
elimination of one rather than the other.  More to the point, one needs 
an explanation of why the redundancy observation (assuming it is val-
id) does not instead require a call for better coordination to reduce re-
dundancies.  Uneasy never seriously compares tort law’s benefits and 
costs with the benefits and costs of safety regulation by other means 
and never contemplates the ways in which tort law already coordi-
nates, or could coordinate, with other sources of safety incentives.54 
B.  The State of the Deterrence Literature (Such as It Is) 
Even apart from the foregoing difficulties, Uneasy is fundamentally 
flawed because it draws firmer conclusions than can be justified given 
the limited number of extant studies and their quality.  To begin with, 
two prior literature reviews — one published by Professor Mark Geist-
feld in 2009,55 the other by Professors Daniel Kessler and Daniel Ru-
binfeld in 200756 — have already addressed the same empirical studies.  
Both assert agnostic rather than negative conclusions.57 
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 53 We do not mean to suggest that these kinds of interactions will always be socially advanta-
geous.  For example, David Bernstein has argued that media hype helped fuel unmeritorious suits 
alleging that silicone breast implants caused recipients to suffer systemic illnesses.  See David E. 
Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457, 467–69, 471 (1999) (book review). 
 54 As noted above, common law doctrine and extant tort legislation provide a certain amount 
of coordination between products liability law, on the one hand, and consumer information and 
regulatory standards, on the other.  See supra pp. 1930–31. 
 55 Mark A. Geistfeld, Products Liability, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
287, 301–04 (Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
 56 Daniel P. Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 343, 351–67 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell 
eds., 2007). 
 57 See Geistfeld, supra note 55, at 301–02 (“The relationship between seller liability and prod-
uct risk is hard to identify empirically.  The available data do not directly measure the relation-
ship, and the injury rate is affected by a number of other factors . . . , undermining the conclu-
sions one can draw from attempts to measure the impact that seller liability has had on product 
 
1932 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1919 
Uneasy also makes some questionable choices with respect to the 
studies it cites and on which it focuses.  Some that purport to cast 
doubt on the deterrent effect of tort law are included despite contain-
ing obvious flaws.58  No serious attention is given to studies that claim 
to find evidence of a deterrent effect.  For example, a 1983 study by 
George Eads and Professor Peter Reuter,59 based on interviews with 
executives of large firms, finds that products liability law has greater 
influence on design decisions than do regulatory law or reputational 
concerns, though the study also finds that the signals tort law sends to 
manufacturers often do not point in any clear direction.60 
Uneasy next places too much weight on studies of atypical prod-
ucts.  Two of its central examples concern airplane and vaccine safe-
ty.61  Neither of these products resembles a standard consumer prod-
uct, such as an article of clothing, a food item, a home appliance, a 
power tool, a toy, or a passenger vehicle.  Airplane manufacturing is 
heavily regulated, and — as Polinsky and Shavell seem to recognize62 
— planes are unusual in that there is a complete overlap between the 
technology that is required for them to perform at all and the technol-
ogy that is needed to prevent the occurrence of the most significant  
hazard that they pose.  Simply put, it would not be surprising to dis-
cover that, even without tort law, plane manufacturers would devote 
significant efforts to rid planes of the sorts of defects that tend to cause 
them to crash.  Developing new vaccines requires massive up-front de-
velopment costs, and the number of alternative design options availa-
ble to manufacturers is limited by human biology, scientific knowledge, 
and FDA regulations.63  Congress decided years ago that vaccines are 
in these and other respects so unique that they warrant the creation of 
a federal compensation scheme for victims of vaccine-related inju-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
safety.”); Kessler & Rubinfeld, supra note 56, at 363 (observing that the corpus of extant studies “is 
only suggestive” and pointing out that some studies have found a deterrent effect, while others 
have not). 
 58 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1458 n.88 (citing Richard S. Higgins, Producers’ Lia-
bility and Product-Related Accidents, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1978)).  Higgins sought to find a 
correlation between accidental fatalities in the home — no matter whether linked to products or 
not (!) — and the elimination by state high courts of the old privity limitation on liability.  For 
criticism, see Geistfeld, supra note 55, at 302.  Note that even Higgins purported to find that lia-
bility has a deterrent effect under certain conditions. 
 59 GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RE-
SPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION (1983). 
 60 Id. at vii–viii. 
 61 Polinksy & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1455–56 (airplane safety), 1457 (vaccine safety). 
 62 Id. at 1456 (noting purchasers’ incentives to ensure that the aircraft they purchase are ca-
pable of remaining airborne). 
 63 See Jones v. Lederle Labs., 785 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (rejecting a design de-
fect claim against a vaccine manufacturer on the ground that, at the time of manufacture, the 
manufacturer could not have designed a safer vaccine that would have obtained FDA approval), 
aff’d per curiam, 982 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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ries.64  And Congress did so in part out of concerns that manufacturers 
would have limited ability to respond to the liability signal and in part 
because tort law might therefore render unavailable or unduly expen-
sive a critically important tool of public health. 
Finally, and most problematically, the article makes a basic catego-
ry mistake in assessing the potential payoff of the studies under review.  
In fact, not one of these studies offers anything in defense of the radi-
cal conclusion Uneasy aims to defend.  As noted above, when Polinsky 
and Shavell question the case for products liability, they are referring 
to products liability in its broad sense — the availability to consumers 
of any tort cause of action by which to recover for their product-
related injuries.  The studies in question all address the different ques-
tion of whether there is a deterrence-based case for products liability 
law in its narrow sense — that is, a case for the mid-twentieth-century 
doctrinal move from liability based on negligence, warranty, and fraud 
to liability based on defect.  The Graham study of automobile safety 
and the studies of general aviation and childhood vaccines all seek to 
measure whether there is an added increment of deterrence associated 
with the shift from a negligence standard to a defect-based standard.  
They say nothing about what would happen to product safety if negli-
gence, warranty, and fraud law were removed from the scene.  To put 
the point bluntly, Uneasy does not cite a single study that even at-
tempts to determine how safe products would be in a world without 
any tort law applicable to products. 
The degree to which Uneasy overreaches can be appreciated by 
contrasting it with the famous deterrence study by Professors Don 
Dewees, David Duff, and Michael Trebilcock.65  Like the surveys men-
tioned above,66 it offers an agnostic conclusion rather than a finding of 
no deterrent effect.67  Moreover, and directly to the present point, it is 
addressed only to the question of whether the marginal safety benefit 
attributable to the replacement of negligence-based liability with strict 
products liability outweighs, or is outweighed by, the costs associated 
with that move.  The study has nothing to say on the question of 
whether all forms of tort liability applicable to product-related injuries 
have a deterrent effect as contrasted with a regime with no tort liabili-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 64 National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2006). 
 65 DON DEWEES, DAVID DUFF & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF 
ACCIDENT LAW (1996). 
 66 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 67 DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 205 (noting that on the basis of studies 
of accident rate data “it is difficult to reach firm conclusions as to whether the tort system has re-
duced accidents caused by defective products,” but further observing that, if it has reduced such 
accidents, “these accidents must be a small fraction of the total [of all injury-causing accidents]”). 
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ty.68  Uneasy is alone in making the improbable claim that widely sold 
products would be as safe if all tort liability to consumers for product-
related injuries were abolished. 
III.  TORT COMPENSATION AND VICTIMS’ WELFARE 
The other potential benefit of products liability law that Uneasy at-
tends to at any length is the provision of compensation to injury vic-
tims.69  Its analysis of this aspect of tort law hinges on the observation 
that many of the costs associated with product-related injuries are 
covered by first-party insurance.  Thus, according to Uneasy, the issue 
is whether tort law as applied to widely sold products provides a  
meaningful increment of compensation beyond insurance.  The article 
concludes that there is little or no reason to believe that products lia-
bility makes any positive contribution to compensation of accident vic-
tims.70  This conclusion is defended on three grounds.  First, successful 
tort suits by persons injured by products often deliver less to plaintiffs 
than the face amount of a settlement or verdict might suggest.  Second, 
because tort compensation tends to supplement insurance benefits that 
already cover health care costs and lost wages, and because of the 
principle of diminishing marginal utility, tort dollars provide less bang 
for the buck than insurance dollars.71  Third, because a significant 
portion of tort compensation is meant to remedy victims’ pain and suf-
fering, and because individuals generally do not pay to insure against 
this form of loss, compensation of these losses is welfare reducing.72 
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 68 Id. (“We conclude that the adoption of a strict liability regime over the traditional negli-
gence regime has not achieved significant, socially desirable safety gains.”). 
 69 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1462–69. 
 70 Id. at 1469. 
 71 See id. at 1466.  Uneasy also claims that many product liability actions seek compensation 
for only modest losses and hence will not provide significant welfare gains to victims.  In support 
of this contention, it observes that many product liability claims are brought as class actions and 
that the class action device was designed to aggregate small claims.  Id. at 1467.  This argument 
ignores the fact that, historically, tort class actions have been controversial precisely because they 
tend to aggregate large claims, many of which would be economically viable if brought individ-
ually.  In any event, it is outdated.  Since the late 1990s, American courts overwhelmingly have 
rejected the use of class actions for products liability cases, with the narrow exception of medical 
monitoring class actions.  Informal aggregations are still an important phenomenon, as are class 
action suits brought under state consumer protection laws.  The former are genuine applications 
of products liability law but do not involve small claims.  The latter involve small claims but are 
not part of products liability law. 
 72 See id. at 1467–68.  The thought is that consumers are being forced to pay a de facto insur-
ance premium built into the price of products, which reflects the added costs for manufacturers of 
liability for pain and suffering damages.  See id.  Consumers’ failure to insure against such losses 
demonstrates that they would not have chosen to pay that premium in exchange for coverage of 
those losses.  By requiring consumers to ‘buy’ insurance through manufacturers’ liability at a 
price that consumers do not want to pay, products liability law forces on consumers a welfare-
reducing transaction.  See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 208 
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Before examining these arguments in more detail, we must again 
emphasize that the amount and specificity of the empirical evidence 
provided cannot carry the heavy burden of persuasion set by Uneasy’s 
central thesis.  The key piece of evidence consists of the observation 
that “[a] substantial majority of Americans have some private or pub-
lic insurance coverage for medical expenses, disability, loss of life, and 
property damage that might result from accidents, including product-
related ones.”73  Yet this sentence and the paragraph of rough-and-
ready statistics that follows it provide only the vaguest picture of the 
coverage actually enjoyed by the average products liability plaintiff.  
No doubt there are some products liability plaintiffs who benefit from 
generous health, disability, and property insurance plans.  However, 
the article makes no attempt to determine how many plaintiffs fall into 
this group and how many belong to the ranks of the partially insured 
or uninsured.  Even regarding the better-off plaintiffs, we are not told 
what sorts of losses products liability accidents are likely to inflict on 
them and how well their insurance will cover those losses.  And no da-
ta are provided that indicate the extent to which coverage is incom-
plete for the remainder of potential victims and how product-related 
accidents would affect members of this group. 
A.  First-Party Insurance and Real-World Compensation 
Uneasy rightly notes that the amount a tort plaintiff takes home af-
ter a favorable verdict or settlement is often less than what it appears 
to be.  First-party insurers (such as automobile insurers, health insur-
ers, home insurers, and disability insurers) enjoy certain contractual, 
equitable, or statutory rights of subrogation.  This means that moneys 
paid out to or on behalf of the victim under an insurance policy are 
sometimes recoverable by the insurer out of the proceeds of the vic-
tim’s tort award.74  Also, attorneys’ fees in products liability litigation 
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& n.22 (2006) (citing as the fount of this argument Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, The De-
mand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q.J. ECON. 143 
(1977)).  For a thoughtful discussion of the ways in which tort law’s being cast as insurance can 
introduce distortions into the analysis of tort law, see Jane Stapleton, Tort, Insurance and Ideolo-
gy, 58 MOD. L. REV. 820 (1995). 
 73 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1462. 
 74 It will rarely be the case that every dollar a victim receives from a tortfeasor for costs cov-
ered by a first-party insurance plan will pass through to the insurer.  Many states have rules that 
limit first-party insurers’ ability to obtain reimbursement via subrogation for coverage related to 
personal injuries.  See Roger M. Baron, Subrogation: A Pandora’s Box Awaiting Closure, 41 S.D. 
L. REV. 237, 247–60 (1996).  Moreover, in practice, first-party insurers often agree to take less 
than the full amount to which they might be entitled.  See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, 
and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 304–08 (2001) (dis-
cussing first-party insurers’ practices with respect to reimbursement in the workers’ compensation 
context).  That insurers typically do not obtain full reimbursement cuts against Uneasy’s compen-
sation argument: the typical tort plaintiff is in fact receiving more compensation than is suggested 
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are typically between twenty-five and forty percent.  And there is of-
ten a time lag between injury and compensation.  Absent the payment 
of prejudgment interest, compensation will thus come at a significant 
discount.  For example, an injury victim who is compensated by a 
payment of $10,000 in 2005 for an injury that cost her $10,000 in 2000 
could well be receiving, say, seventy-five cents on the dollar. 
Even bracketing the situation of the completely uninsured, the idea 
that insurance takes care of the important costs of injuries is vastly 
overblown, as a simple set of examples will demonstrate.  Consider 
Jones, who suffers a broken shoulder when his car crashes because its 
brakes are defective.  Jones incurs $35,000 in medical expenses and 
property damage, of which insurance covers $30,000.  Let us suppose 
that he suffers substantial lost wages and income diminution, of which 
$65,000 is not covered by any form of disability or unemployment in-
surance.75  Notably, Jones is seeking compensation only for economic 
losses.  Now consider three scenarios in which Jones prevails in a tort 
action against the car manufacturer. 
Scenario 1:  In an ideally fast and accurate tort system with subro-
gation and the standard American rule for attorneys’ fees, Jones might 
realistically expect to receive $77,000 in compensation based on an 
award of $100,000 reflecting his pecuniary losses.  (He initially obtains 
$30,000 in insurance payments plus $100,000 in tort damages, but then 
can expect to pay back $20,000 to his insurer through subrogation and 
must also pay $33,000 to his lawyer.) 
Scenario 2:  Jones obtains a verdict of $100,000 three years after 
the accident.  The defendant waives its right to appeal the verdict in 
return for an agreement that excludes Jones’s recovery of prejudgment 
interest.  Assume that Jones’s insurer paid $30,000 in benefits to Jones 
at the time of the accident and that the remaining $70,000 in losses 
that have until now gone unpaid are today worth $92,000.  After 
$20,000 goes to the insurer through subrogation, Jones is left with 
$80,000 from his award.  His lawyer receives $33,000, leaving Jones 
with $47,000.  Even with a recovery of $100,000 in damages for pecu-
niary losses, Jones thus comes out $45,000 short of what would actual-
ly make him whole ($92,000 worth of uninsured losses minus $47,000 
in retained tort recovery). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
by its discussion of subrogation.  True, the article’s diminishing marginal utility argument, dis-
cussed below, could in theory cut in the other direction by suggesting that these additional tort 
compensation dollars are of relatively low value.  However, that argument is itself flawed.  See 
infra p. 1938.  In the examples we provide below, we assume less-than-full reimbursement 
through subrogation. 
 75 Assume, for example, that Jones initially cannot work at all, and then when he is able to 
work, must take a job that pays significantly less. 
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Scenario 3:  Jones’s case quickly settles for $60,000, which equals 
sixty percent of the $100,000 in pecuniary damages he was prepared to 
prove at trial.  His lawyer receives one-third of the settlement figure 
($20,000), and his insurer obtains $10,000 via subrogation.76  Jones is 
left with $30,000, leaving him $40,000 short of the amount that would 
make him whole for his uninsured losses. 
Obviously the $30,000 Jones receives in Scenario 3 or the $47,000 
he receives in Scenario 2 is far less than his true loss (even after taking 
into account first-party insurance benefits and excluding any nonpecu-
niary losses).  What is harder to comprehend is why either of these fig-
ures would not count as a significant contribution to his welfare.77  It 
is certainly true that if Jones had ended up with, say, $90,000, it would 
be appropriate to characterize that recovery as being more significant.  
This larger number would also constitute a significant percentage of 
his total losses, whereas $30,000 does not.  But the question at hand is 
not whether Jones has received a large or small percentage of the total 
loss he suffered.  Rather, it is whether the tort compensation provided 
to him offers a significant contribution to his well-being.  Assuming 
that they are realistic depictions of the sort of recoveries products lia-
bility claimants tend to receive — and we think they are — Scenarios 
2 and 3 suggest that the tort system’s provision of less-than-face-value 
compensation does not support Uneasy’s claim that welfarist consider-
ations call for the abolition of whatever tort compensation a plaintiff 
such as Jones stands to receive.  Quite the opposite, one might plausi-
bly suppose that the $30,000 provided to Jones in Scenario 3 could be 
very important to his welfare.  More generally, there seems to be little 
reason to suppose that there is a positive correlation between the con-
tribution of the plaintiff’s final collectible amount of damages to his 
welfare, on the one hand, and the ratio of that number to the damages 
to which he was entitled, on the other. 
To supplement its seemingly unrealistic argument that products 
liability adds little to compensation already provided from private or 
public insurance, Uneasy invokes the concept of diminishing marginal 
utility.  Extra dollars received from tort compensation, the article says, 
are not nearly as valuable as the initial dollars received from first-
party insurers.78  The force of this argument hinges on the actual slope 
of plaintiffs’ utility curves and our ability sensibly to place damage 
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 76 The insurer’s lower reimbursement in this scenario reflects the majority make-whole rule, 
under which a first-party insurer is formally not entitled to subrogation until the plaintiff has re-
ceived damages equal to her actual loss.  See Baron, supra note 74, at 249–52.  In practice, how-
ever, insurers have negotiating leverage that usually permits them to obtain partial  
reimbursement. 
 77 Cf. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1469. 
 78 See id. at 1466 n.118. 
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awards received by plaintiffs on those curves.  As to the second of 
these considerations, we see no reason to suppose that most persons 
who are injured by defective products obtain coverage from first-party 
insurance compensation at a level beyond which further compensation 
is not of ‘high value.’  Certainly no reason is provided in Uneasy.79  In 
fact, the overwhelming likelihood is that first-party insurance tends 
not to make whole even those with insurance, even with respect to on-
ly their pecuniary losses.  As the preceding discussion indicates, law in 
practice generates gaps between what many plaintiffs are entitled to 
demand by way of compensation from the defendant and what they 
recover.  In these cases, the added dollars obtained by the plaintiff 
atop insurance coverage are likely to be anything but the ‘gravy’ that 
marginal utility analysis might disparage as being of low value. 
For the foregoing reasons, we find the marginal utility argument 
puzzling as framed.  Perhaps it instead aims to assert that products 
liability law does a poor job as a compensation system relative to al-
ternatives that can provide greater compensation at a lower cost.  
However compelling, this is not an argument that tort law does not 
contribute to social welfare by its provision of compensation to injury 
victims.  Rather, it is a suggestion that if a cost-benefit analysis is done 
on the compensation prong alone, various alternative compensation 
systems will come out ahead.  This is a different — and familiar — 
point.  The efficiency shortcomings of products liability law as a com-
pensation system should indeed be counted as costs.  But Uneasy has 
provided us with no reason to reject the idea that tort law generates 
meaningful compensation benefits.  Given that products liability might 
well also generate safety benefits, the balance of Uneasy’s central  
equation is perhaps not so obviously skewed toward the cost side as 
the article supposes, even on its artificially narrow metrics.80 
It may also be that Polinsky and Shavell are operating within a 
model according to which, absent a showing of market failure, private 
insurance markets are thought to demonstrate just how much value 
individuals assign to the availability of compensation in the event of 
an injury.  If this contention were true, it would follow that those who 
are uninsured or underinsured have indicated that they do not value 
compensation as much as the insured, and hence should not receive 
reimbursements that they themselves have deemed not worth the cost 
of purchasing.  The obvious reply to this line of argument is that 
people are uninsured or underinsured for lots of reasons — including, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 79 At this level of abstraction, the argument that tort compensation is ‘low value’ would li-
cense the conclusion that, from a welfarist point of view, states should enact statutes mandating 
that first-party insurers pay out only the first eighty percent of the coverage promised under their 
policies, since the last fifth of compensation is of less value than the first four-fifths. 
 80 See infra pp. 1941–47 (discussing costs and benefits not addressed by Uneasy). 
2010] EASY CASE 1939 
of course, that they cannot afford to purchase more insurance — not 
only because compensation for accident-related injuries is not of great 
value to them.81 
B.  Pain and Suffering Damages and the Insurance Argument 
Uneasy’s final point is a familiar one:82 insofar as tort compensa-
tion covers noneconomic losses and insofar as people do not insure 
themselves against the possibility of such losses, the tort system de-
tracts from overall welfare.  Uneasy makes this unwanted-cost-
spreading argument83 through the example of a plaintiff who is 
deemed to have suffered a $365.84 loss of welfare by virtue of her abil-
ity to collect pain and suffering damages.84  Although a number of 
concerns are raised by this example, the most straightforward are evi-
dent even from within a welfarist framework.85  For example, neither 
the passage itself nor the footnote supporting it justifies the claim that 
the consumer will be made worse off in an amount equal to the entire 
extra cost of the product attributable to the manufacturer’s having to 
stand ready to pay for pain and suffering damages.86 
Regardless, the unwanted-cost-spreading argument distracts us 
from a larger point about the real-world value of having a de jure 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 81 Polinsky and Shavell might in turn reply that, insofar as lack of wealth or poor information 
is driving the failure to purchase insurance, that is a problem within the domain of fairness and 
thus not an appropriate consideration for cost-benefit analysis.  Putting to one side the question of 
why fairness arguments are inappropriate in this context, the main difficulty with this envisioned 
line of argument is that it takes us away from the topic we have been investigating: whether the 
compensation provided under current products liability law is valuable from within a welfarist 
framework and whether such value would be lost by removing tort liability for injuries caused to 
consumers by widely sold products.  In trying to make sense of the suggestion in Uneasy that 
sums such as the $30,000 provided to Jones in Scenario 3 by the tort system are not worth much, 
we have supposed that this suggestion rests on the idea that Jones’s choice not to insure himself 
for greater losses demonstrates that he did not regard compensation for such losses as worth 
enough to induce him to pay to insure against them.  Our point in response is simply this: if Jones 
had no money to obtain greater coverage, there is no reason to suppose that the $30,000 being 
paid to Jones has no value for him after the accident has occurred.  And this is the relevant ques-
tion for the welfarist inquiry into the extent to which products liability law provides compensa-
tion, not whether it was unfair that Jones had less money to begin with. 
 82 On the deterrence and compensation roles of pain and suffering damages in products liabili-
ty litigation, see GEISTFELD, supra note 72, at 208–11; Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the 
Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 349–55 (2006). 
 83 See supra note 72. 
 84 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1468–69. 
 85 At least one important article has challenged this conclusion from within a law and econom-
ics framework as well.  Id. at 1468 n.125 (citing Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecu-
niary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 
(1995)). 
 86 See id. at 1468–69 & n.124.  That the consumer would decline to spend $365.84 for pain and 
suffering insurance does not establish that she would pay nothing for it; rather it means that she 
would only pay some lower amount. 
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right to nonpecuniary damages.  Let us return to the case of Jones, ex-
cept that we will now suppose that in addition to $100,000 in economic 
damages, he claims (in good faith) $100,000 in noneconomic damages.  
With this fact added, consider again the two more realistic Jones sce-
narios — Scenarios 2 and 3.  Suppose a $200,000 verdict is returned 
three years after the accident and an appeal by the defendant is 
waived in exchange for the elimination of prejudgment interest.  Dur-
ing this time the underlying $70,000 in uninsured pecuniary losses has 
become worth $92,000.  Jones now will recover $114,000 — an amount 
that exceeds his actual uninsured pecuniary losses by only $22,000.87 
Meanwhile, on a plausible variation of Scenario 3, if the plaintiff’s 
ability to prove $200,000 in total damages generates a quick settlement 
for the full value of his economic damages ($100,000), then Jones’s 
lawyer will take $33,000, while his insurer is reimbursed for $10,000, 
leaving Jones with $57,000.  In this hypothetical, Jones’s $100,000 set-
tlement succeeds only in shrinking his total uninsured pecuniary loss of 
$70,000 to a loss of $13,000, while his claim for $100,000 in noneco-
nomic losses is left entirely uncompensated.  Because the overwhelm-
ing majority of plaintiffs who receive any compensation in products 
liability lawsuits do so via settlement, and because a settlement at fifty 
cents on the claimed dollar strikes as, if anything, generous relative to 
the settlement secured by the average plaintiff, Scenario 3 is probably 
quite common.  And in that scenario especially, there is no reason to 
doubt the welfare-enhancing nature of the victim’s $100,000  
settlement. 
The supposed consumer preference to refrain from insuring future 
noneconomic losses is irrelevant to deciding whether the availability of 
noneconomic damages is welfare-enhancing.  Even conceding that it 
makes sense to talk about consumers paying a premium for products 
to cover the cost to manufacturers of pain and suffering awards, a se-
rious welfarist assessment would have to recognize that consumers are 
not, for the most part, buying noneconomic damages insurance poli-
cies.  Instead, they are primarily purchasing better insurance policies 
against pecuniary losses.  Being realistic about tort law cannot stop 
merely at the recognition that (some) consumers harmed by widely sold 
products have insurance in unspecified amounts and that consumers 
generally do not buy insurance against pain and suffering losses.  It 
must also include an investigation of the terms on which settlements 
are actually reached.88 
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 87 $200,000 – $20,000 (subrogation) – $66,000 (attorneys’ fees) = $114,000 compensation for 
pecuniary losses stipulated to be worth $92,000 at the time of verdict. 
 88 Professor Geistfeld has argued that because of attorneys’ fees and perhaps other undercom-
pensated pecuniary costs, pain and suffering awards may be justifiable from a compensatory ra-
tionale, notwithstanding the insurance argument.  Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and 
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IV.  THE COSTS OF LAW REFORM 
We noted at the outset that Uneasy is not an advocacy document.  
Instead, it sets out a metric against which to measure the worth of a 
body of law and argues that, in all probability, that law is more trouble 
than it is worth, thereby offering in-principle support for law reform.  
Perhaps it is not the authors’ responsibility to anticipate costs asso-
ciated with the reform efforts guided by their analysis, but it is surely 
the responsibility of an advocate or lawmaker to do so.  In this part, 
we briefly canvass some such costs, if only to highlight other important 
considerations that would have to figure in a complete cost-benefit  
accounting. 
One of the virtues of Uneasy is its insistence that we assess tort law 
as but one of several institutions that address or could address prod-
uct-related injuries.  But this same observation also points to costs that 
will probably attend the elimination of most tort liability in the do-
main of products.89  One might label these “dependency costs.”  For 
example, it is entirely plausible — as is apparently conceded90 — that 
some market pressure for manufacturers to attend to product safety is 
dependent on knowledge made available by media coverage of prod-
ucts liability litigation.  Likewise, products liability litigation not only 
can serve as a counterweight to regulatory capture, it may also en-
hance the performance of regulators.  We would suppose, for example, 
that the risk of being exposed for lax or incompetent regulation by 
subsequent products liability litigation at times serves as an incentive 
for appropriate regulatory diligence.  More broadly and elusively, the 
common law responsibility to avoid injuring consumers by the circula-
tion of defective products elaborates and reinforces a norm of atten-
tiveness to safety.  The absence of such responsibility could easily lead 
to a deterioration of that norm, and with it, lowered consumer expec-
tations of product safety, a greater willingness among manufacturers’ 
employees to convince themselves that they are entitled to act in irre-
sponsible ways, and a diminished likelihood of government interven-
tion to ensure product safety. 
Furthermore, the elimination of liability for injuries to consumers 
caused by widely sold products would probably require markets and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 
CAL. L. REV. 773, 800–02 (1995).  As Geistfeld also emphasizes, a full cost-benefit analysis of non-
economic damages must assess not only their compensatory benefits (if any), but also their contri-
bution to deterrence (if any).  See id. at 797–98, 802–03. 
 89 Of course, if one wants to classify these actual or potential effects as benefits of products 
liability law, then one does not need to recount their absence as dependency costs.  But one way 
or another, the practical decision to eliminate products liability claims cannot be reached without 
counting them. 
 90 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 1454–55. 
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regulators to pick up at least some of the slack with respect to deter-
rence and compensation.  These ‘retooling costs’ would include the 
costs to businesses and individuals of new or more aggressively en-
forced safety regulations and expanded first-party insurance coverage.  
It may be that these costs would prove justified in the abstract, but 
there is no reason to assume that the public and private actors impos-
ing or incurring these new costs would judge them to be worth the 
benefit of getting rid of products liability law.  It may also be that a 
greater reliance on the transmission of information to consumers for 
product safety generates new problems, including the problem — 
commonly raised as a reason to limit liability for failure to warn of 
product dangers — of information overload.91 
A related question asks whether it would, in the end, be practical 
to eliminate products liability law within the parameters proposed in 
Uneasy.  To the extent that tort reform proposals entail reforms that 
are difficult to implement or facially arbitrary, they generate what 
might be called “systematicity costs.”  How are legislators, judges, or 
jurors to determine what counts as a widely sold product?  Who 
counts as a bystander?  Is it credible to have a body of law that per-
mits a cause of action for a person who suffers serious burns when his 
custom-made suit, made of readily flammable material, catches fire, 
whereas the person who suffers identical injuries from a department-
store suit made of the same material recovers nothing? 
Finally, any law revision in a given area inevitably emboldens a 
wide variety of actors to seek other reforms that superficially seem re-
lated but, in reality, are far less justified.  When, so emboldened, they 
succeed in obtaining such changes, that, too, is a cost.  These might be 
dubbed the “opportunistic costs” of law reform.  One does not need to 
be paranoid to think that an abandonment of tort law for widely used 
consumer products would create a political slippery slope that would 
reach not only narrowly used products, but also medical malpractice 
and other domains in which tort law currently operates. 
V.  TORT LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT-RELATED INJURIES:  
THE EASY AND THE HARD 
We have been highly critical of the central assertion of Uneasy: that 
tort liability for widely sold products fails cost-benefit analysis and 
therefore should be eliminated or significantly scaled back.  Of course 
it is easier to criticize than to make a positive case, and readers may be 
wondering about our own affirmative judgments.  Do we mean to de-
fend products liability law against Uneasy’s particular critique, or do 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 91 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: 
The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 293–94 (1990). 
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we mean to claim affirmatively that products liability law is defensible 
more generally?  The answer is both. 
Construed merely as a caution against the embrace of particularly 
ambitious pro-liability agendas, Uneasy is on reasonable ground.  Pro-
fessors Guido Calabresi and Jon Hirschoff, for example, famously of-
fered a deterrence argument for assigning liability simply by virtue of 
an actor’s being in a relatively good position to prevent a certain type 
of injury from occurring in the future.92  To the extent that liability on 
these terms would be so strict as to depart from common law prin-
ciples and notions of responsibility, one would want to see an impres-
sive showing that it really does add an important increment of deter-
rence beyond that provided by a regime that already recognizes claims 
for negligence, breach of warranty, and fraud.  As Uneasy reminds us, 
however, the empirical evidence for that effect has thus far been mod-
est, at best.  On the compensation side, scholars such as Fleming 
James, Jr., once argued that true strict liability is preferable to even a 
relatively plaintiff-friendly fault-based version of products liability be-
cause of the former’s greater ability to deliver compensation to the in-
jured.93  A powerful (and longstanding) reply to this claim focuses on 
the expenses associated with the delivery of compensation via the tort 
system.  Others have invoked the idea of enterprise liability, according 
to which a profit-making enterprise that predictably generates harms 
to others is deemed obligated to take on those costs.  Notwithstanding 
work by Professor Gregory Keating defending this line of argument,94 
we certainly understand Polinsky and Shavell’s suspicion that, for cas-
es in which there is not even a whiff of manufacturer fault, the aver-
age consumer would prefer cheaper products and first-party insurance.  
Such preferences, if they exist, would cut against this fairness rationale 
for strict liability, at least to some extent. 
For these sorts of reasons, one can reasonably doubt whether there 
is a case to be made for recognizing a cause of action that extends 
manufacturers’ responsibilities beyond the sort of defect-based liability 
that we now have.  Unfortunately, to the extent that Uneasy is treated 
as arguing merely for the rejection of this incremental increase in lia-
bility, it is coming late to the party and without much by way of new 
supplies.  In any event, to say that there is an uneasy case for strict 
products liability — in the sense of liability entirely unmoored from 
even an extended sense of fault — is not to say that the case for tort 
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 92 Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 
1055, 1060–61 (1972). 
 93 Priest, supra note 2, at 474–75 (citing Fleming James, Jr. & John J. Dickinson, Accident 
Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REV. 769, 780 (1950)). 
 94 Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 1266 (1997). 
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liability with respect to product-related injuries is uneasy.  In fact, we 
think that the case for allowing persons injured by defective products 
to obtain redress is very easy.  It rests on the idea that a manufacturer 
bears a responsibility to avoid causing injury by sending a dangerously 
defective product into the stream of commerce and is supported by 
principles grounded in negligence and warranty, even though it ex-
tends those principles in certain ways.95 
Our grounds for thinking there should be such claims are manifold 
and include not only the provision of incentives for safety and com-
pensation both directly and via the indirect benefits mentioned above, 
but also considerations of accountability, structural constitutionalism, 
egalitarianism, and rule-of-law values.96  In this respect, the case for 
the imposition of liability on manufacturers for product-related inju-
ries more or less on the terms set by current law is no different from 
the case for the recognition of tort law in many other instantiations.  
There are many reasons to have a law that defines injurious wrongs, 
permits victims to respond to those who have wronged them through 
the courts, and deems a commercial seller that injures someone 
through the sale of a dangerously defective product to have committed 
such a wrong. 
It is a truism — but by no means a vacuous observation — that 
products liability law allows victims who have been wrongfully in-
jured by the seller of a defective product to invoke the legal system to 
hold the seller accountable.  This is at some level the most basic 
attribute of products liability law, as some simple examples will  
demonstrate. 
A child eating a tuna sandwich bites into a small nail, severely in-
juring her mouth and throat.  Her grandfather purchased the tuna 
from a grocery store.  Assuming there is nothing to suggest that the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 95 Familiarly, this cause of action, unlike traditional implied warranty actions, permits claims 
by persons other than those in privity with the seller.  Unlike negligence, it does not require proof 
of a failure to exercise ordinary care in the design and manufacturing process.  Needless to say, 
there are important disputes over how best to capture the concept of a defective product, and 
about whether that concept in the end stands apart from ideas of carelessness and breach of war-
ranty.  These disputes need not concern us here, given the breadth of the argument to which we 
are responding. 
 96 Polinsky and Shavell might be inclined to deem these grounds as irrelevant to cost-benefit 
analysis.  As we cannot adequately engage larger questions of methodology in this forum, we will 
content ourselves to offer two observations to this imagined response.  First, we are deliberately 
eschewing any appeal to fairness in the sense that Polinsky and Shavell, following Kaplow and 
Shavell, use the term.  Polinsky and Shavell, supra note 16, at 1440 n.7.  We are not arguing for 
recognition of liability for defective products on the ground that it will serve distributive justice.  
Second, and relatedly, we see nothing about welfarist analysis that would permit the exclusion of 
the sorts of considerations we offer in favor of recognizing tort liability for injuries caused by de-
fective products: each is entitled to be taken into account from within Polinsky and Shavell’s 
framework. 
2010] EASY CASE 1945 
nail was introduced into the can after it left the manufacturer’s posses-
sion, the manufacturer will be subject to manufacturing defect liability 
for the child’s injuries.97 
A woman purchases a lawn chair.  She unfolds it and sits down, 
cupping her fingers around the plastic armrests that adhere to the 
metal frame.  The folding mechanism that attaches to the bottom of 
the armrest is sharp.  When the chair unfolds, it pinches and then cuts 
off the woman’s right index finger.  The manufacturer will be subject 
to liability for the injury caused by its defectively designed product.98 
A man who is in his mid-50s exercises regularly but sometimes ex-
periences serious back pain.  His physician prescribes him a new pain 
medicine.  While taking it as prescribed, the man has a debilitating 
heart attack.  The manufacturer has been aware of studies suggesting 
that users of this medicine experienced a four-fold increase in the risk 
of heart attack but has fought the FDA’s efforts to require warnings of 
this risk, has distorted or concealed some data in its communications 
with the FDA, and has instructed its marketing force to communicate 
to physicians that the studies are no cause for concern.  In the over-
whelming majority of jurisdictions, the manufacturer would be subject 
to liability to the man for failing to warn him, through his physician, 
of the risk of heart attack.99 
Any serious evaluation of products liability law must count it as a 
benefit that victims such as these can hold the relevant manufacturers 
accountable for having wrongfully injured them.  There are many 
ways of expressing this point, and judges and law professors argue 
amongst themselves about how best to capture the nature and value of 
this sort of accountability.  Our position is that the law recognizes that 
tort plaintiffs are entitled to recourse against a wrongdoer for injuries 
caused by the wrongdoer’s breach of a duty to refrain from injuring 
them in certain ways.100  Others — for example, Professor Stephen 
Perry — have argued that tort law enforces a moral duty to repair 
losses associated with certain bad outcomes caused by one’s faulty 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 97 Cf. Coulter v. Am. Bakeries Co., 530 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming ver-
dict for plaintiff who swallowed metal wire in doughnut but rejecting jury’s comparative fault 
finding).  
 98 Cf. Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956); Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 
849 (N.C. 1988) (applying Florida negligence and strict products liability law to a similar 
fact pattern).  
 99 Cf. Alex Berenson, Merck Suffers a Pair of Setbacks over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 
2006, at C1. 
 100 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 
MD. L. REV. 364 (2005) (arguing that Calabresi’s critique of negligence law fails to appreciate the 
values it serves as part of a broader law of wrongs and redress); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin 
C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998) (arguing that the wrong of 
negligence consists of a breach of a duty of non-injury owed to persons such as the plaintiff). 
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conduct.101  Judges, juries, and lawyers are typically comfortable say-
ing that if an injury really is in some sense the defendant’s fault, then 
the defendant should be held accountable for it.  While consumers can 
shun producers of unsafe products, and regulators can impose fines or 
order recalls, neither of these processes renders manufacturers answer-
able to consumers injured by their unsafe products.  Of course, as ad-
vocates of tort reform have tirelessly argued, the accountability-
assigning features of tort law can be abused.  Hence, they are hardly 
an unmitigated plus.  One must count such misfires as a cost of this 
system for holding wrongdoers accountable to their victims.  Also of 
concern are costs of an opposing sort — namely the features of extant 
law that defeat meritorious claims. 
Distinct from accountability per se, the law’s recognition of prod-
ucts liability serves or instantiates other values to be counted as among 
the ‘benefits’ it delivers.  By empowering victims to demand a deter-
mination whether they have been victimized and, should they prove 
their cases, by entitling them to recourse, tort law grants to citizens an 
important political power.  Most individuals have relatively little say 
over how government will look out for their basic interests, including 
bodily integrity and freedom of movement.  To be sure, they have 
rights to vote, petition, speak, and assemble, and these rights are prob-
ably valuable in encouraging government to attend to the general wel-
fare.  But (for good reasons) they cannot, as individuals, demand that a 
legislature attend to or protect them in particular, nor can they force 
an agency to refrain from trading off their interests when making and 
enforcing regulations that bear on their well-being.  By the same to-
ken, other parts of the law (again, for good reason) impose significant 
limits on the ability of individuals to take steps to protect themselves 
from others, at least where doing so might harm others.  Tort law, by 
contrast, grants citizens rights to complain about and, upon appropri-
ate showings, obtain redress for conduct that adversely affects them.  
As such, it is a part of a complex constitutional structure that aims to 
balance the need for law to tend to the general welfare with the need 
to take the interests of individuals seriously.  In its absence, citizens are 
disempowered — they lose the ability to demand of law and govern-
ment that those institutions take the protection of their interests to 
heart.  The elimination of tort law with respect to a broad swath of 
product-related injuries would constitute a significant weakening of 
this structural feature of our government, particularly if one takes into 
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 101 Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992). 
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account worries about opportunism costs of the sort discussed 
above.102 
A familiar refrain of consumer-protection advocates is that prod-
ucts liability law is necessary to protect ordinary individuals from the 
predations of large corporations.103  Even if the David-and-Goliath as-
pects of this narrative tend to be overstated, these commentators make 
an important point.  Along with its inegalitarian, status quo–
reinforcing tendencies, tort law’s particular form of accountability has 
an important egalitarian dimension: it confers on individuals and firms 
an authority to hold each other accountable.104  Moreover, it does so 
on terms that are largely indifferent to social and political status.  An 
individual of modest means can, under the appropriate circumstances, 
obtain recourse against a giant corporation for having wronged her.  
At the same time, a person of substantial means can, on the same 
terms, demand from a less-well-off person compensation for interfer-
ences with those holdings.  We do not mean by this observation to 
suggest that wealth and power have no influence on the actual opera-
tion of the tort system, nor to deny that the form of recourse typically 
provided by tort law — money damages — significantly limits its 
availability as against wrongdoers with few assets.  And like every 
other beneficial aspect of tort law, this aspect has associated down-
sides, including the occasional imposition of liability as a form of ‘Rob-
in Hood’ justice.  Still, in both principle and practice, tort law’s par-
ticular form of accountability has an egalitarian aspect that renders it 
distinctive and valuable, and the law of products liability is in this 
particular way equality reinforcing. 
We observed above that any proposal to reform a particular area of 
tort law, such as products liability law, potentially raises issues of legit-
imacy.  This is because our political culture is rich with notions of re-
sponsibility.  As a general matter, we demand of each other behavior 
that is responsible in the sense of attending sufficiently to the possible 
deleterious effects of our actions on others.  This is not to say that we 
expect or predict people will consistently so behave, or that we our-
selves are always attentive to these responsibilities.  Rather it is to say 
that we believe that they owe it to us, just as we owe it to them.  For 
centuries, our law has embodied, in different ways, and to different 
degrees, norms of this sort.  Criminal law and punishment is one such 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 102 The point is not that tort law cannot be reformed in defendant-friendly ways without un-
dermining our constitutional order.  Rather, it is that an appreciation of tort law’s place in our 
constitutional structure provides a reason that counsels against such reform, as well as guidance 
as to why and how such reform should be undertaken. 
 103 THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 2 (2001). 
 104 See Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 N.W. L. REV. 1765 
(2009). 
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embodiment.  Tort law is another.  The elimination of a substantial 
and prominent body of tort doctrine — in this case, liability for widely 
sold products — runs counter to these norms.  It confers an exemption 
from responsibility that is untoward simply by virtue of being an im-
munity.  Even when justified, immunities can plausibly be defended 
only as necessary departures from baseline norms of responsibility and 
accountability, norms embodied in the ubi jus ibi remedium maxim.  
Part of what is so worrying about the most aggressive aspects of Un-
easy is its seeming willingness to treat what is at best a necessary evil 
as if it were an unalloyed good. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
What shall we say, then, about the justifiability of products liability 
law — conceived as a modernized amalgam of negligence, misrepre-
sentation, and warranty that, through the concept of a defective prod-
uct, permits certain injury victims to hold manufacturers (and retail-
ers) accountable?  We should say that the case for products liability 
law, so conceived, is easy.  It holds manufacturers accountable to per-
sons victimized by their wrongful conduct.  It empowers certain injury 
victims to invoke the law and the apparatus of government to vindi-
cate important interests of theirs.  It instantiates notions of equality be-
fore the law and articulates and reinforces norms of responsibility.  
And in doing all these things, it contributes in direct and indirect ways 
to deterrence and provides welfare-enhancing compensation.  For all 
these reasons and others, it is extremely valuable that courts, at the 
behest of victims, have the authority to order commercial sellers of de-
fective products that cause injury to compensate their victims. 
If it is all so easy, one might ask, why are legislatures heatedly de-
bating whether to reform products liability law?  The answer is that 
there is a host of related questions that are difficult.  To name only the 
most visible: how much defect-based liability retailers should face, 
how non-class aggregate litigation over product-related injuries should 
be structured to achieve both efficiency and due process, how eviden-
tiary rules should be framed for causation issues, how and when regu-
latory law should trump tort law and who should decide this issue, 
and how concerns about excessive and arbitrary damage awards 
should be addressed and by which institution(s).  The mere recitation 
of these familiar issues suggests that there are important aspects of 
products liability law about which we should be uneasy.  That is why 
they have earned a great deal of judicial, legislative, and scholarly at-
tention.  But the case for products liability law itself is easy. 
